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Abstract
Testing the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing
them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a
multiple expert setting it is possible to design a contract that only informed experts accept and
uninformed experts reject. The tester can pit competing forecasts of future events against each
other and take advantage of the uncertainty experts have about the other experts’ knowledge.
This contract will work even when there is only a single data point to evaluate.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between two self-proclaimed experts who deliver forecasts of
future events to a principal, called Alice. Alice needs a mechanism to induce informed experts to
reveal their knowledge honestly and to screen uninformed experts that would deliver useless and
potentially harmful forecasts.
In recent literature, there has been an active debate around the general problem of whether a
decision maker can successfully evaluate the forecasts of self-proclaimed experts and screen them
from uninformed ones. The seminal paper was one by [7] where they show that a calibration test
can be passed by uninformed experts. In the setting of evaluating an expert in isolation the matter
is pretty much settled with the elegant impossibility result by Olszewski and Sandroni [10] showing
that any test that does not rely on counterfactuals and can be passed by informed experts, can
also be passed by an uninformed one. 1 Dekel and Feinberg [4] show a test based on eventual
counterfactuals that only informed experts can pass.
Such results motivate evaluating multiple experts at once, since the possibility of one forecast
performing better than another in some metric opens new possibilities for screening. In such setting
there have been mixed results regarding special cases; Al-Najjar and Weinstein [1] show that under
the assumption that an informed expert is present, a comparative test of their forecasts can pick the
∗E-mail: fbarrer@sas.upenn.edu This paper is based on my dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in the Department of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes.
1 In [10] a similar proof is given to show that, in a single expert setting, there are no contracts that only informed
experts would accept
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true expert with high probability. Feinberg and Stewart [6] provide a test that, when restricted to
certain types of forecasts (that could possibly contain the true odds), cannot be passed by uninformed
experts. On the other hand, Olszewski and Sandroni [9] extend their previous results to show that
two uninformed experts can independently pass a comparative test, even with infinitely many data
points at the disposal of the tester.
Another approach to the problem deals with considering the incentives of potential experts to
misrepresent their beliefs or honestly reveal their knowledge. Echenique and Shmaya [5] introduce
the idea that a false expert might do ‘no harm’ if his false information does not worsen the outcome
compared to a prior belief held by the tester. This idea is explored further by Sandroni [11] to
propose contracts, based on scoring rules, that incentivize informed experts to reveal the truth and
uninformed experts to ‘do no harm’. Important progress was also made by Babaioff, Lambert et al.[2]
by using scoring rules that screened uninformed experts under certain non-convexity assumptions.
I extend Sandroni [11] in the following way; Alice offers a contract to a set of experts that
determines money transfers based on their forecasted odds of a future state of Nature and the actual
observation of such state. This contract specifies transfers according to how high each forecast scores
on a Brier score [3] compared to the rival forecasts. Such contract can be designed so that it is
accepted by informed experts and gives incentives to revealing the true odds, but it is rejected by
uncertainty averse uninformed experts. The same contract is used in a general setting, where there is
not a perfectly informed expert but rather partially informed ones, to screen for the better informed
expert.
The result in this paper can be understood as the conclusion to the debate regarding the possi-
bility of screening informed and uninformed experts. In a more general setting, when it is possible
to test multiple experts at once, there is a simple contract that only informed experts would accept.
Moreover, this result holds even when evaluating on a single data point.2
2 The Model
Let S be a finite set of states. Let ∆(S) be the set of probability distributions over S. Two experts,
referred to as expert 1 and expert 2, deliver probabilistic forecasts f1 and f2 ∈ ∆(S) to a tester
named Alice.
Alice creates a contract that specifies money transfers between her and each expert to elicit
information. A contract is a payoff function C : ∆(S)×∆(S)× S → R whose value depends on the
announced odds and the observed state. If any expert rejects the contract his payoff is 0.3 Consider
the behavior of expert 1, who is offered a contract C1. In the case that both experts accept their
respective contracts, they deliver odds f1 and f2. When state s is observed, expert 1 receives (or
gives) payoff C1 (f1, f2, s).
If informed, expert 1 maximizes his expected utility conditional on the other expert’s fore-
cast. It is said that Expert 1 accepts a contract if for every f1, f2 ∈ ∆(S) the contract satisfies
Ef1 {C1 (f1, f2, ·)} > 0, where E
f1 is the expected value under odds f1. That is, when revealing the
truth gives him a positive payoff regardless of the other expert’s forecast. Moreover, he honestly
reveals his beliefs when for all f2 ∈ ∆(S) and f
′ 6= f1 ∈ ∆(S)
Ef1 {C1 (f1, f2, ·)} > E
f1 {C1 (f
′, f2, ·)} ,
which is a property that proper scoring rules will guarantee and it ensures that informed experts will
not misrepresent their beliefs. If uninformed, he evaluates his prospects using the minmax criteria
2Results are presented for two experts, but can trivially be extended to an arbitrary number of experts.
3If only one expert remains then the tester is sure he’s informed. He can receive a second contract that incentivizes
honestly revealing his knowledge, like in [11].
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as in Gilboa and Schmeidler [8].4 Considering both experts may announce their odds using random
generators of forecasts ξ1andξ2 ∈ ∆(∆(S)) (a mixed strategy) this can be stated as saying that he
only accepts contract C1 when there exists a random generator of forecasts ξ1 such that
min
f∈Θ1
ξ2∈∆∆(S)
∫
∆(S)
∫
∆(S)
EfC1 (f ′, f∗, ·, ) dξ2 (f
∗) dξ1 (f
′) > 0,
where Θ1 is a closed subset of ∆(S) that contains the forecasts expert 1 deems plausible.
3 Main Result
Proposition 1. Assume that Θ1 contains at least two points. There exists a contract C1 such that
expert 1, if informed, will accept and will incentivize her to reveal her knowledge and, if uninformed,
will reject.
The intuition of the proof is simple. Design a contract that gives a payoff proportional to the
difference of the Brier score plus a small enough ε. Informed experts can be assured to get paid
at least ε since the Brier score is maximized with the true odds. Uninformed experts get negative
payments in the worst case scenario, which is when the other expert is informed and forecasts the
truth with probability 1, because they cannot produce a randomized strategy that is always close
to the truth. Because the value of ε depends on the set Θ1, this solution does not give a single
contract that screens every possible pair of uninformed experts, but rather, for each pair of experts
a contract that screens informed from uninformed experts can be designed.5
This contract can be used in a more general setting involving partially informed experts. An
expert is partially informed if he is uninformed and his set of plausible forecasts Θ takes the form
Bδ (f
∗) = {f ∈ ∆(S) : ‖f − f∗‖ ≤ δ} for f∗ ∈ ∆(S).6 An expert is said to be better informed than
another when their sets of plausible forecasts are Bε1(f1), respectively Bε2 (f2) , and ε1 < ε2 for some
pair of forecasts f1 and f2.
Proposition 2. In a setting with two partially informed experts, there exists a contract such that
only the better informed expert would accept.
The assumption that there are perfectly informed experts is unrealistic. Proposition 2 shows
that even when one expert is slightly better informed than another, there is a contract that achieves
perfect screening. Proposition 1 might be regarded as a limit case of proposition 2.
This contract resembles the test in [1] in that it compares forecasts against each other in a
way that the forecast of the better informed expert will perform better than the other forecasts.
However, unlike the test in [1], we do not make the strong assumption that the tester knows about
the presence of one informed expert. For our contract to work, It is enough to assume that the
experts are uncertain about each other’s type and strategy. This assumption cannot be dispensed
entirely since, under this contract, uninformed experts with identical forecasts can always secure a
positive payment.
Another noteworthy difference is that the test in [1] cannot guarantee that the informed expert
will be picked. In contrast, the contract in this paper simply has no incentive for uninformed experts
to accept it, thus, this mechanism achieves perfect screening.7
4The uninformed expert is extremely averse to uncertainty and does not have a prior, instead, she will only accept
a contract if she gets a positive payoff in her worst case scenario.
5To design this contract, the tester can just query the experts for two outcomes that they deem plausible.
6A reasonable assumption is that the true odds be in Bε (f∗) but this is not necessary for the result.
7 The comparative test in [1] cannot fail an uninformed expert that, by chance, produces a forecast close to the
truth.
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4 Conclusion
Screening informed and uninformed experts can be difficult when evaluating a single expert, however,
the presence of multiple experts brings strategical uncertainty to uninformed experts which can be
exploited to design a contract that only informed experts would accept.
5 Appendix
Lemma 5.1. The Brier Score B : ∆(S) × S → R, defined as B(f, s) = 2f(s)−
∑
s′∈S (f (s
′))
2
− 1
is such that
Ef{B(g, ·)} = ‖f‖22 − ‖f − g‖
2
2 − 1,
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the L2 (R) norm.
Proof.
Ef{B(g, ·)} = −
∑
s∈S
f(s)
(
1− 2g(s) +
∑
s′∈S
(g (s′))
2
)
=
∑
s′∈S
(g (s′))
2
+
∑
s∈S
2f(s)g(s)− 1
= ‖f‖22 − ‖f − g‖
2
2 − 1
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Let B be the Brier Score, as previously defined, and let fx and fy be two different elements
of Θ1. Define the contract C1 for expert 1 as C1 (f1, f2, s) = B (f1, s)−B (f2, s)+ε, where ε =
‖f−g‖22
2 .
If expert 1 is informed, he accepts the contract because, applying Lemma 5.1
Ef {C1 (f, f2, ·)} =
(
‖f‖22 − ‖f − f‖
2
2 − 1
)
−
(
‖f‖22 − ‖f − f2‖
2
2 − 1
)
+ ε
= ‖f − f2‖
2
2 + ε > 0
Moreover, the informed expert honestly reveals the truth since ∀f1 6= f
Ef {C1 (f, f2, ·)} = ‖f − f2‖
2
2 + ε > ‖f − f2‖
2
2 − ‖f − f1‖
2
2 + ε = E
f {C1 (f1, f2, ·)}
On the other hand, if expert 1 is uninformed and forecasts using a random generator of forecasts
ξ1, we begin by noting that his maxmin payoff is bounded above by the one obtained if the other
expert forecasts the truth (which he would if he is informed).8 Formally
8Here we are using the assumption that an uninformed expert considers the possibility that a competing expert
might forecast the true odds. For example, if he is unsure about whether the other expert is informed or not. This is
a weaker assumption than the one in [1] where they assume that the principal knows that a true expert is present.
4
min
f∈Θ1
ξ2∈∆∆(S)
∫∫
∆(S)∆(S)
Ef
1
1 (f ′,f∗,)dξ2(f∗)dξ1(f ′) = min
f∈Θ1
ξ2∈∆∆(S)
∫∫
∆(S)∆(S)
(
‖f − f2‖
2−
2 ‖f − f1‖
2
2 + ε
)
dξ2 (f
∗) dξ1 (f
′)
≤ min
f∈Θ1
∫
∆(S)
ε− ‖f − f1‖
2
2 dξ1 (f
′) = min
f∈Θ1
∫
∆(S)
EfC1 (f ′, f, ·) dξ1 (f
′) (1)
However, the expression in (1) is negative for every value of ξ1 because
min
f∈Θ1
∫
∆(S)
ε− ‖f − f1‖
2
2 dξ1 (f
′) = ε− max
f∈Θ1
∫
∆(S)
‖f − f1‖
2
2 dξ1 (f
′)
≤ ε− max
f∈Θ1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∫
∆(S)
f − f ′dξ1 (f
′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= ε− max
f∈Θ1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ f −
∫
∆(S)
f ′dξ1 (f
′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
,
where the inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality since ‖ · ‖22 is convex. The function f¯ :=∫
∆(S)
f ′dξ1 (f
′) , satisfies f¯ ∈ ∆(S) and then, using the triangular inequality
ε− max
f∈Θ1
∥∥∥∥∥f −
∫
∆(S)
f ′dξ1 (f
′)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= ε− max
f∈Θ1
‖f − f¯‖22
≤ ε−
∥∥fx − f¯∥∥22 + ∥∥fy − f¯∥∥22
2
≤ ε−
‖fx − fy‖
2
2
2
< 0
so the uninformed expert never accepts the contract.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. Let Θ1 = Bε1 (f1) and Θ2 = Bε2 (f2) for a pair of forecasts f1 and f2 in ∆(S). Without loss
of generality assume ε2 > ε1 > 0. Let B be the Brier Score and let γ be such that ε
2
2 > γ > ε
2
1. Define
contracts C1 and C2 for experts 1 and 2 respectively as C1 (f1, f2, s) = B (f1, s)−B (f2, s)+ γ
2 and
C2 (f2, f1, s) = B (f2, s)−B (f1, s) + γ
2.
As before, provided that experts may use random generators of forecasts ξ1, ξ2 ∈ ∆(∆(S)), expert
i will accept the contract if there exists ξi ∈ ∆(∆(S)) such that
min
f∈Θi
ξj∈∆∆(S)
∫∫
∆(S)∆(S)
(
‖f ′ − f‖+
(
γ − ‖f − f∗‖
2
2
))
dξi (f
∗) dξj (f
′) > 0
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It is simple to see that expert 1 accepts his contract, because he can get a positive payoff by
making ξ1 ({f1}) = 1. Formally
min
f∈Θi
f2∈∆(∆(S))
||f ′ − f ||+
(
γ − ‖f − f1‖
2
2
)
dξ2 (f
′) ≥ min
f∈Θi
γ − ‖f − f1‖
2
2 ≥ γ − ε
2
1 > 0,
the first inequality coming from the fact the ‖ · ‖ is non-negative and the second from the fact that
Θ1 = Bε1 (f1). Since there are two forecasts fx and fy in Θ2 such that γ < ε
2
2 ≤
‖fx−fy‖
2
2
2 , then
expert 2 rejects the contract following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.
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